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Innovation Policy and Chronic
Emergencies
Robert Burrell* & Catherine Kelly**
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has thrust the potential role of the
state as a driver of scientific innovation onto center stage. Vaccines have
been developed and brought to market in a timescale that seemed almost
impossible when the crisis first struck. The pivotal nature of government
intervention in this crisis has added to calls from academics and policy
makers to adopt a more proactive, mission-oriented approach to
innovation policy to tackle other key global challenges.
This Article considers the merits of these calls and argues that an
important distinction must be drawn between what this Article terms
acute and chronic emergencies. COVID-19 is a paradigmatic example of
an acute emergency: its onset was rapid, its impact was dramatic, and
it is a problem that demands resolution for life to proceed “as
normal.” Chronic emergencies, such as the problem of
Anti-Microbial Resistance, can be just as, or more deadly than, acute
emergencies but have a “frog in the pot” quality. They emerge over time,
and, although they can have profound social and economic effects, they
do so in ways that are less immediate and hence less demanding of
government attention. Without the urgency, sense of purpose, and spirit
of cooperation that accompany acute emergencies, there is a risk that
mission-oriented approaches may fail to deliver new technologies the
world urgently needs. This Article considers the problem of applying
mission-oriented approaches to chronic emergencies. The analysis is
grounded in an examination of Britain’s system of innovation rewards
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, drawing on an extensive
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historical data set that the authors are continuing to develop. The
central argument put forward in this Article is that Britain’s historical
system offers lessons for crafting state intervention to spur innovation
aimed at chronic emergencies today. Britain’s historical system was
effective because rewards were largely bestowed post hoc with relatively
little prescription as to the problems at which innovators should direct
their efforts, and still less as to the methods and means that should be
used to tackle them. Perhaps most importantly, these rewards fed into
and helped create a culture of innovation.
The Article concludes with a proposal for change—namely, that
the way innovation prizes are designed should be reconsidered. Prizes
must preserve space for scientific and technical freedom and ought not
to be built around the sort of rigidly defined criteria that proponents of
mission-oriented innovation policies often advocate.
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I. INTRODUCTION

By September 2021, the COVID-19 pandemic was estimated to
have killed roughly 4.6 million people.1 Over the pandemic’s
duration, global deaths from Anti-Microbial Resistance (AMR) have
totaled approximately 1.16 million,2 and ambient air pollution has
killed around 6.3 million people.3 The latter killers have been a problem
1.
Cumulative Confirmed COVID-19 Cases and Deaths, World, OUR WORLD IN DATA,
https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/cumulative-deaths-and-cases-covid-19?time=2020-0122..2021-09-30 [https://perma.cc/7EZA-8AHH] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
2.
See New Report Calls for Urgent Action to Avert Antimicrobial Resistance Crisis,
WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.who.int/news/item/29-04-2019-new-reportcalls-for-urgent-action-to-avert-antimicrobial-resistance-crisis [https://perma.cc/SR2E-XTG8].
3.
The WHO reports that ambient air pollution kills 4.2 million people
annually. Air Pollution, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health-topics/air-pollution#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/U8P3-AAX2] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021). The WHO
declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic on 11 March 2020. Domenico Cucinotta &
Maurizio Vanelli, WHO Declares COVID-19 a Pandemic, 91 ACTA BIOMEDICA 157 (2020). At the
time
of
writing
(July
2021),
this
suggests
that
ambient
air
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for many years,4 and the death toll from these causes of mortality looks
set to increase significantly.5 There are, for example, estimates that
AMR will cause 10 million deaths per year by 2050.6 These grim
estimates highlight some of the serious challenges facing humanity, but
they also illustrate a marked variance in attitude and approach
between acute emergencies and chronic emergencies. COVID-19 is a
paradigmatic example of an acute emergency—its onset was rapid, its
impact dramatic, and it is a problem that demands resolution so life can
return to “normal.” Faced with this emergency, governments around
the world swung into action and played a critical part in the progress
made in turning the tide of the pandemic.7 As economist Joseph Stiglitz
observed, “[The] government had a central role in the victory—from
investments in basic science that enabled the rapid genomic
characterization of SARS-CoV-2 and the development of COVID-19
vaccines, to contributing to the financing of the mass production and
deployment of the vaccines.”8 The recent pandemic thus illustrates the
potential for the state to drive science and innovation. The pivotal
nature of government intervention in this crisis has added further
impetus to calls for adoption of a more proactive, mission-oriented
approach to “innovation policy” (used here in the broad sense of the full
set of policy instruments used to support the creation and diffusion of
novel products, processes, and services).9 Calls for a shift towards a
pollution will have killed approximately the number quoted, although we acknowledge that the
disruption to travel and other polluting economic activity caused by the pandemic makes it
harder to calculate a reliable figure for the period.
4.
Awareness of the problem of air pollution increased across the 1960s and ’70s leading to
the adoption of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution. Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature Nov. 13 1979, 34 U.S.T. 3043, 1302
U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Mar. 16, 1983). The initial driver for this Convention was
concern over the environmental impact of ‘acid rain’ but increasing scientific understanding of the
importance of urban air pollution for human health meant that this issue soon came to the
forefront in international discussions. See Jørgen Wettestad, Designing Effective Environmental
Regimes: The Case of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), 10
ENERGY & ENV’T 671, 678 (1999). For a brief history of AMR, see Scott H. Podolsky, The Evolving
Response to Antibiotic Resistance (1945–2018), 4 PALGRAVE COMMC’NS 124 (2018) (noting that by
the 1950s antibiotic resistant strains of Staphylococcus aureus were causing deaths worldwide).
5.
REV. ON ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE, ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE: TACKLING
A CRISIS FOR THE HEALTH AND WEALTH OF NATIONS 6 (2014), https://amr-review.org/sites/default/files/AMR%20Review%20Paper%20%20Tackling%20a%20crisis%20for%20the%20health%2
0and%20wealth%20of%20nations_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD54-YFP8].
6.
Id.
7.
Joseph Stiglitz, A Call to Arms to Change Capitalism, 397 THE LANCET 1797, 1797
(2021).
8.
Id.
9.
Cf. Jakob Edler, Paul Cunningham, Abdullah Gök & Philip Shapira, Impacts of
Innovation Policy: Synthesis and Conclusion 1 (Nesta Working Paper No. 13/21, 2013),
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more mission-oriented approach to innovation policy predate the
current crisis, however, and form part of a general intellectual backlash
against the neoliberal trope that government intervention in the
economy almost always does more harm than good.10
This Article is not premised on ideological opposition to the state
playing a greater role in innovation policy nor, indeed, in the economy
more broadly. But this does not mean that the response to COVID-19
or any other acute emergency constitutes the best way to structure
innovation policy generally. Approaches that may work for dealing with
acute emergencies do not necessarily translate to tackling chronic
emergencies like AMR or ambient air pollution. Chronic emergencies
have a “frog in the pot” quality. They emerge over time, and although
they can have profound social and economic effects, they do so in ways
that are less immediate and hence less demanding of government
attention. Moreover, chronic emergencies are often felt most acutely in
poorer parts of the globe.11 Without the urgency, sense of purpose, and
spirit of cooperation that accompany acute emergencies, there is a real
risk that mission-oriented approaches may fail to deliver in other
situations. The suggestion that a mission-oriented approach is the best
way to produce the innovations necessary to confront the existential
threat posed by climate change is, therefore, one that needs to be
handled with care. There is, however, at least one historical precedent
for the state playing an active role in helping to solve chronic

https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/impacts_of_innovation_policy_synthesis_and_conclusion_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS5Y-QECM] (defining innovation policy as “public intervention
to support the generation and diffusion of new products, processes or services”). For further discussion of the definition of “innovation policy” see, for example, Jan Fagerberg, Innovation Policy:
Rationales, Lessons and Challenges 31 J. ECON. SURVS. 497 (2017).
10.
See, e.g., MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC
VS. PRIVATE MYTHS IN INNOVATION (2015) [hereinafter THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE].
11.
This is true for both the current pandemic and climate change. See Meeting Coverage,
General Assembly, Countries in Special Situations Hardest Hit by Climate Crisis, Pandemic,
Delegates Say, as Second Committee Continues Session, U.N. Meetings Coverage and Press
Releases, GA/EF/3551, (Oct. 7, 2021), https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/gaef3551.doc.htm
[https://perma.cc/2Y52-PTP4]. It is also true for AMR. Sunil Pokharel, Shristi Raut & Bipin
Adhikari, Tackling Antimicrobial Resistance in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries, BMJ
GLOB. HEALTH, Nov. 2019, at 1, 1 (noting that “AMR affects all countries, but the burden is
disproportionately higher in low-income and middle-income countries”). The particular
vulnerability of developing countries to adverse events is often said to flow from the more limited
“adaptive capacity” of such countries. See, e.g., LINDSEY JONES, EVA LUDI & SIMON LEVINE,
TOWARDS A CHARACTERISATION OF ADAPTIVE CAPACITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING ADAPTIVE
CAPACITY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL (2010), https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/6353.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8PW-QNMP].
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emergencies:12 this is the system of rewards employed by the British
State in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.13
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, the authors develop
their analysis of the differences between acute and chronic emergencies
and how these differences connect to recent calls for a greater use of
mission-oriented interventions to spur innovation. In Part III, the
Article explores the lessons that can be drawn from Britain’s historical
experience of using cash payments and other emoluments alongside the
patent system to reward inventors. The authors demonstrate that
Britain’s system of rewards was effective because those rewards were
typically granted post hoc with relatively little prescription as to the
problems toward which innovators should direct their efforts, and still
less as to the methods and means that should be used to tackle
them—perhaps most importantly, they fed into and helped create a
culture of innovation. In the final Part, the authors draw on these
observations to make a proposal for change, namely, that governments
and other bodies should reconsider the way in which they design
innovation prizes. Prizes must preserve space for scientific and
technical freedom and ought not to be built around the sort of rigidly
defined criteria for which proponents of mission-oriented innovation
policies often advocate are often advocated by proponents of
mission-oriented innovation policies.
II. EMERGENCIES AND MISSION-ORIENTED INNOVATION POLICY
Innovation policy changes in the face of emergency. Patent
rights are weakened,14 procurement rules are quietly rewritten,15 and
public agencies and philanthropic bodies that fund research shift their
attention to projects that will help solve the crisis at hand.16 These
shifts in innovation policy have all formed part of the global response to
the COVID-19 crisis.17 Countries indicated a willingness to use
compulsory licenses to lower the costs of patented COVID-19 vaccines
at the very start of the pandemic.18 More recently, a group of countries,
12.
See infra Part III.
13.
See infra Part III.
14.
See infra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
15.
See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
16.
See infra notes 22–23 and accompanying text.
17.
See infra notes 18–23 and accompanying text.
18.
See, e.g., Proyecto de Resolucion para el Otorgamiento de Licencias No Voluntarias
Contempladas en el Articulo 51 No. 2 de la Ley No. 19.030 de Propiedad Industrial para Facilitar
el Acceso y Disponibilidad a los Medicamentos y Tecnologias para la Prevencion, Tratamiento y
Cura del Coronavirus Covid-19, Camara de Diputadas y Diputados de Chile, translated in
English “Resolution for the Granting of Non-Voluntary Licenses Referred to in Article 51º Nº 2 of
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led by India and South Africa,19 have proposed an intellectual property
waiver over all products relevant to the prevention, containment, or
treatment of COVID-19 under the TRIPS Agreement.20 Sizeable
advanced market commitments have been offered to companies
developing vaccines.21 Research-funding councils in the United
Kingdom,
Republic
of
Ireland,
and
elsewhere
set
up
fast-track approval processes for projects addressing the pandemic.22
Charitable bodies, such as Wellcome, have similarly directed significant
funding towards the same ends.23
The proactive, mission-oriented approach to innovation policy
that has developed in response to acute emergencies can
unquestionably produce results.24 Perhaps the most famous examples
of these types of successful mission-oriented policies come from the
Industrial Property Law Nº 19.030 to Facilitate Access and Availability of Medicines
and
Technologies
for
the
Prevention,
Treatment
and
Cure
of
Coronavirus
COVID-19”, KNOWLEDGE ECON. INT’L, https://www.keionline.org/chilean-covid-resolution
[https://perma.cc/K6SK-65NJ] (last visited Jan. 23, 2022).
19.
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Waiver from Certain
Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment of COVID-19,
WTO Doc. IP/C/W/669 (Oct. 2, 2020); Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Prop. Rts., Waiver
from Certain Provisions of the TRIPS Agreement for the Prevention, Containment and Treatment
of COVID-19: Revised Decision Text, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/669/Rev.1 (May 25, 2021).
20.
See generally Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869
U.N.T.S. 299 (setting up a framework to harmonize intellectual property rights at a high level).
21.
See EU Strategy for COVID-19 Vaccines, at 3–4, COM (2020) 245 final (June 17, 2020)
[hereinafter EU Strategy]. Advanced market commitments were historically understood as a way
of financing the development of novel therapeutics for the treatment of diseases prevalent in the
global south. See Brook K. Baker, Patents, Pricing, and Access to Essential Medicines in Developing
Countries, 11 VIRTUAL MENTOR 527, 529 (2009). However, in the conditions of the pandemic, many
Western governments have entered into such arrangements with potential suppliers of vaccines.
See, e.g., EU Strategy, supra, at 3–4, 8–9. For example, the European Commission concluded eight
advanced purchase agreements with pharmaceutical companies as part of the EU’s strategy to
tackle COVID. European Parliament Press Release, COVID-19: Updates on Advance Purchases of
Vaccines (Mar. 22, 2021); see also EU Strategy, supra, at 3 (noting that such agreements “de-risk
the necessary investments related to both vaccine development and clinical trials, and the
preparation of the at-scale production capacity along the entire vaccine production chain”).
22.
See, e.g., Tackling the Impact of COVID-19, U.K. RSCH. & INNOVATION,
https://www.ukri.org/our-work/tackling-the-impact-of-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/8L7M-4G89]
(last visited Dec. 16, 2021); COVID-19 Rapid Response Funding Call (Phase 2), SCI. FOUND.
IR., https://www.sfi.ie/funding/funding-calls/covid19-rapid-response [https://perma.cc/852V-X73V]
(last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
23.
See
Who
We
Are,
WELLCOME,
https://wellcome.org/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/T2WD-6VCL] (last visited Dec. 17, 2021). Wellcome describes itself as “a
politically and financially independent global charitable foundation, funded by a £29.1 billion
investment portfolio.” Id. For details of Wellcome’s Covid programmes, see COVID-19: Supporting
Global Research and Development, WELLCOME, https://wellcome.org/what-we-do/our-work/coronavirus-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/FW52-MY38] (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
24.
See infra notes 25–27 and accompanying text.
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Second World War, including the mass production of penicillin and the
development of novel vaccines, as well as technologies more directly
related to success on the battlefield.25 The critical role that the
government played in bringing COVID-19 vaccines to market provides
further illustration of the potential of well-directed, mission-oriented
policies.26 The consequent delivery of COVID-19 vaccines in an
extraordinarily short period of time has created further impetus around
calls for the state to play an active and interventionist role in the
science and technology sphere.27 But in many Western countries, such
calls predate the current crisis.28 For example, in early February 2020,
Dominic Cummings—at the time, Chief Adviser to Boris Johnson and a
key figure in his administration—was reported to have identified the
creation of a UK equivalent to the US Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA) as the second most important priority on the
UK Government’s agenda, behind only the completion of Brexit.29 In a
similar vein, the comprehensive strategic plan for Australian
innovation published in 2017 placed renewed emphasis on the role of
the public sector in driving and supporting innovation, including
through more aggressive use of public procurement to support high-tech
start-ups and other innovative businesses.30 There have been similar
moves in this direction in the European Union, where the European
Commission has also been pushing to mobilize procurement
expenditure as a driver of innovation.31
25.
See Daniel P. Gross & Bhaven N. Sampat, Organizing Crisis Innovation: Lessons from
World War II 17–29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 27909, 2021),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w27909/w27909.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5ULJACT]. For discussion of the development of vaccines during the Second World War, see KENDALL
HOYT, LONG SHOT: VACCINES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 49–80 (2012).
26.
See, e.g., Filippo Reale, Mission-Oriented Innovation Policy and the Challenge of
Urgency: Lessons from Covid-19 and Beyond, TECHNOVATION, Sept. 2021, at 1, 1 (“[F]inding a
vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 (and all its strands) is more than just colloquially a “mission,” it is in
fact conceptually a prime example of ‘mission-oriented innovation policy.”).
27.
See, e.g., MARIANA MAZZUCATO, MISSION ECONOMY: A MOONSHOT GUIDE TO CHANGING
CAPITALISM 123–24 (2021) [hereinafter MISSION ECONOMY].
28.
See infra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
29.
Madeleine Gabriel, ARPA: What Is It and Why Does Dominic Cummings Want One in
the UK?, CONVERSATION (Feb. 3, 2020, 4:10 PM), https://theconversation.com/amp/arpa-what-isit-and-why-does-dominic-cummings-want-one-in-the-uk-130975 [https://perma.cc/SFK8-3EQR].
30.
See INNOVATION & SCI. AUSTL., AUSTRALIA 2030: PROSPERITY THROUGH INNOVATION
57–73(2017), https://www.industry.gov.au/sites/default/files/May%202018/document/pdf/austral
ia-2030- prosperity-through-innovation-full-report.pdf?acsf_files_redirect [https://perma.cc/TCS3W7LR].
31.
See Commission Notice, Guidance on Innovation Procurement, 2021 O.J. (C 267) 1,
11–27 [hereinafter Guidance II]. In 2014 the European Union introduced ‘innovation
partnerships’, the main feature of which is that innovation occurs during the performance of the
contract. Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014
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The resurgence of interest in the state’s role in fostering
innovation has a number of interrelated causes.32 Strategic
competition with China has created a new urgency around the
importance of not falling behind in the “global innovation race,”33
language that has an echo of the Cold War rivalry of the
mid-twentieth-century “Space Race.”34 China’s rapid technological
progress has been underpinned by an activist state, controlled by a
communist party that legitimatizes itself as having rescued China from
the “century of humiliation” caused by the country having fallen behind
the West in science and technology.35
China’s increasing technological prowess has coincided with a
broader resurgence of academic interest in the role of the public sector
in supporting innovation.36 Mariana Mazzucato’s enormously
influential work on the “entrepreneurial state” puts the US government
at the heart of America’s technological pre-eminence and economic
success.37 She argues that the seemingly poor performance of the public
sector in picking winners is often explained by the fact that the state is

on Public Procurement and Repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, art. 31, 2014 O.J. (L 94) 65, 112–13.
Over more recent years the European Commission has been pushing for the use of these
partnerships to mobilize procurement expenditure as a driver of innovation. See Guidance II,
supra. These efforts can be traced back to the 2017 Making Public Procurement Work in and for
Europe, COM 572 final (Oct. 3, 2017). This led to the publication in 2018 of the Guidance on
Innovation Procurement, COM 3051 final (May 15, 2018), and its revision in 2021. See Guidance
II, supra, at 5.
32.
See infra notes 33–35, 37–48 and accompanying text.
33.
This language has been used by both the Australian and UK governments. See Bill
Ferris, Foreword to INNOVATION & SCI. AUSTL., supra note 30, at iii; DEP’T FOR BUS., ENERGY &
INDUS. STRATEGY, UK INNOVATION STRATEGY: LEADING THE FUTURE BY CREATING IT 8 (2021),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1009577/uk-innovation-strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/TG5X-M3R2].
34.
See Karsten Werth, A Surrogate for War—The U.S. Space Program in the 1960s, 49
AM. STUD. 563, 568–69 (2004). As to the importance of the rise of China to the shift in Western
thinking, see, for example, Eric Schmidt, I Used to Run Google. Silicon Valley Could Lose to China,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/27/opinion/eric-schmidt-aichina.html [https://perma.cc/8M9P-P4F3] (“[I]n recent years, Americans—Silicon Valley leaders
included—have put too much faith in the private sector to ensure U.S. global leadership in new
technology. Now we are in a technology competition with China that has profound ramifications
for our economy and defense—a reality I have come to appreciate as chairman of two government
panels on innovation and national security. The government needs to get back in the game in a
serious way.”).
35.
See generally ORVILLE SCHELL & JOHN DELURY, WEALTH AND POWER: CHINA’S LONG
MARCH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 189–90 (2013) (emphasizing throughout the importance
of the redemption narrative in Chinese culture and politics).
36.
See infra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
37.
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE, surpa note 10.
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betting on races that the private sector avoids altogether.38 Subsequent
scholarship has, inter alia, demonstrated the importance of the support
of the federal government and State of California to the evolution of
Silicon Valley,39 dusted off interest in the role of Japan’s Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in the country’s post-war
economic miracle,40 and looked at the role of Russia’s “science cities” in
continuing to produce internationally significant breakthroughs.41
Scholars have even re-evaluated the role of Britain’s industrial
revolution which has historically been the poster child for supporters of
a laissez-faire approach to innovation.42 Contrary to the received
wisdom, recent historical work has shown that public and quasi-public
institutions played a vital role in encouraging and shaping innovation
across the key period of Britain’s industrial development.43
38.
See id. at 25 (“We are constantly told that the State should have a limited role in the
economy due to its inability to ‘pick winners’, whether the ‘winners’ are new technologies, economic
sectors, or specific firms. But what is ignored is that, in many of the cases that the State ‘failed’,
it
was
trying
to
do
something
much
more
difficult
than
what
many
private businesses do . . . .”).
39.
MARGARET O’MARA, THE CODE: SILICON VALLEY AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICA 22–
24 (2019).
40.
See, e.g., DYLAN GERSTEL & MATTHEW P. GOODMAN, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUD. FROM INDUSTRIAL POLICY TO INNOVATION STRATEGY LESSONS FROM JAPAN, EUROPE, AND
THE UNITED STATES 6 (Sept. 2020), https://www.wita.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/200901 Gerstel_InnovationStrategy_FullReport_FINAL_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4Q4K-NTZW]. The importance of Japan’s economic bureaucracy to that nation’s success was famously articulated by
CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY,
1925-1975 (1982).
41.
Helena Schweiger, Alexander Stepanov & Paolo Zacchia, The Long-Run Effects of
R&D Place-Based Policies: Evidence from Russian Science Cities 1 (Eur. Bank for Reconstr. &
Dev., Working Paper No. 216, 2018). For further analysis of the history and modern operation of
Russia’s science cities, see, for example, Igor A. Monakhov, Science Cities Within Innovative
Environments of Russia and Great Britain: Cross-Country Comparison 12 AKTUAL’NI PROBLEMY
EKONOMIKY [ACTUAL PROBLEMS IN ECONOMICS] 220, 221 (2015) (“The history of Russian science
cities can be traced back to the Soviet period, when the USSR was making enormous efforts to
gain advantage in key technologies, win space and nuclear arms race with the USA. This has
resulted in the foundation of science cities as territorial units with high concentration of top
secret research centers and institutions, whose missions were to conduct fundamental and
applied research in such fields as nuclear technology, aerospace, microelectronics etc.”).
42.
See, e.g., TERENCE KEALEY, THE ECONOMIC LAWS OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 60–81
(1996).
43.
See, e.g., Robert Burrell & Catherine Kelly, Public Rewards and Innovation Policy:
Lessons from the Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries, 77 MODERN L. REV. 858, 859 (2014)
[hereinafter Public Rewards and Innovation Policy] (focusing, in particular, on the complex
system of prizes and rewards that were used to incentivize innovation during this period); ANTON
HOWES, ARTS AND MINDS: HOW THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF ARTS CHANGED A NATION, at xi (2021)
(arguing that the Royal Society of Arts, a notionally private body but one that enjoyed extremely
close links to the State, served as “Britain’s national improvement agency”). For a recent defense
of the traditional view, see B. ZORINA KHAN, INVENTING IDEAS: PATENTS, PRIZES, AND THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 82 (2020).
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Other factors have also contributed to the recent trend in
innovation policy. These include a broader intellectual shift away from
the Washington consensus in the aftermath of the global financial
crisis,44 and in the face of concern about rising inequality.45 At a more
practical level, they include concerns about the high—and rising—cost
of drugs that has caused attention to be focused on the role of public
funding in the early stages of pharmaceutical research.46
Among the drivers for reform of innovation policy has been an
additional factor that goes more directly to the theme of “emergency.”
This is, of course, the need to tackle climate change.47 The need to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions has, for example, led to calls for a new

44.
See Andrew Sparrow, Katherine Baldwin & Heather Stewart, Today’s G20 Deal Will
Solve Financial Crisis, Claims Gordon Brown, GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2009, 1:32 PM),
https://amp.theguardian.com/world/2009/apr/02/g20-summit-gordon-brown-hails-deal
[https://perma.cc/T52G-GMXJ]. The Washington consensus referred originally to the set of policy
prescriptions that Washington-based institutions were promoting to developing countries in the
late 1980s. Over time it has come to denote the general set of free market ideas supported by
organizations such as the IMF, World Bank and western governments. See John Williamson, The
Strange History of the Washington Consensus, 27 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 195, 195–96
(2004–2005) (this paper is particularly significant as it was Williamson who first coined the term
“Washington consensus”); see also John Marangos, The Evolution of the Term “Washington
Consensus” 23 J. ECON. SURV. 350, 350 (2009). The shift in meaning has been most pithily captured
by Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Post Washington Consensus Consensus, in THE WASHINGTON
CONSENSUS RECONSIDERED: TOWARDS A NEW GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 41, 41 (Narcis Serra &
Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2008) (“Whatever its original content and intent, the term ‘Washington
Consensus’, in the minds of most people around the world, has come to refer to
development strategies that focus on privatization, liberalization, and macro-stability . . . .To most
people, the Washington Consensus represents a set of policies predicated upon a strong
faith—stronger
than
warranted
either
by
economic
theory
or
historical
experience—in unfettered markets and aimed at reducing, or even minimizing, the role of
government.”). The role of the 2008 global financial crisis in shaking faith in the economic
orthodoxy on which the Washington Consensus rested has been much discussed, but perhaps most
famously the end of the era of the Washington Consensus was announced by British Prime
Minister Gordon Brown at the G20 meeting in London that was organized in 2009 to coordinate
the international responses to the still unfolding global financial crisis. See Sparrow et al., supra.
45.
The latter concern was brought into sharp focus with the publication of THOMAS
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 657–58 (2014).
46.
See, e.g., U.K. LABOUR PARTY, MEDICINES FOR THE MANY: PUBLIC HEALTH BEFORE
PRIVATE PROFIT 9 (2019), https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Medicines-For-TheMany.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6EL-C5FD]; see also Bhaven N. Sampat & Frank Lichtenberg, What
Are the Respective Roles of the Public and Private Sectors in Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 30
HEALTH AFFS. 332, 332–33 (2011) (demonstrating that government funding played a role in almost
half of all drugs examined in the study and almost two thirds of priority-review drugs).
47.
See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE
2021: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (2021), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_Full_Report.pdf (reporting the seriousness of the challenge of anthropogenic
climate change and arguing for urgent action).

2022]

INNOVATION POLICY & CHRONIC EMERGENCIES

231

Manhattan Project to promote energy and environmental solutions.48
More generally, the challenge of climate change has informed much of
the recent scholarship on the state’s role in fostering innovation,
including Mazzucato’s work.49 The scale of the challenge posed by
climate change means that we should be slow to dismiss ideas for
change, but conversely, the enormity of the threat is such that we need
to ensure that changes in policy are underpinned by clear thinking. One
area in which caution is needed is in the way the idea of
“mission-oriented” innovation policy is being employed.
Historical case studies demonstrate that mission-driven
innovation policies can produce results.50 But one also must take care
in moving from the success of the Manhattan Project,51 the Soviet
nuclear weapons program,52 or the Apollo moon landings to support for
dirigiste innovation policies generally.53 Mission-oriented policies can,
but do not always, work well when societies are confronted with the
need to solve a serious and discrete problem in a short period of time
(that is, in the authors’ terminology, an “acute emergency”).54 Even in
these cases, “success” requires that an agreed solution can be identified
and measured.55 Further, the underlying science must be at a point
48.
Naomi Oreskes, We Need a New Manhattan Project to Deal with Climate Change, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/11/14/is-nuclear-power-theanswer-to-climate-change/we-need-a-new-manhattan-project-to-deal-with-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/58E6-US5C].
49.
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE, supra note 10, at 117–18.
50.
See supra note 25 and accompanying text; infra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.
51.
See generally JIM BAGGOTT, THE FIRST WAR OF PHYSICS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE
ATOM BOMB, 1939-1949 (2011) (describing in part the innovations which made the Manhattan Project a success).
52.
See generally id. (describing in part the innovations which made the Soviet nuclear
weapons program a success).
53.
See generally THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE, supra note 10 (describing in part the
innovations which made the Apollo project a success).
54.
For a comparative analysis of the success and failure of different mission-oriented
policies, see DEBORAH D. STINE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34645, THE MANHATTAN PROJECT, THE
APOLLO PROGRAM, AND FEDERAL ENERGY TECHNOLOGY R&D PROGRAMS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 5–8 (2009), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/RL34645.pdf [https://perma.cc/29QF-96QV] (discussing the relative failure of the federal energy technology R&D programs of the 1970s, and noting that “the threat posed by climate change, which is related to energy consumption, will likely
be gradual and long-term”).
55.
This is a point that has been emphasized, inter alia, in discussions of Cold War era
mission-oriented policies. See, e.g., Slavo Radoševića & Imogen Wade, Modernization Through
Large S&T Projects: Assessing Russia’s Drive for Innovation-Led Development via Skolkovo
Innovation Centre 13 (Ctr. for Compar. Econ., Univ. Coll. London Sch. Slavonic & E. Eur. Stud.,
Econ. & Bus. Working Paper No. 131, 2014), https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1454656/2/Skolkovo_WP_Sep_2014_WP_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C9A-L8HQ] (noting that in the case of
developing nuclear weapons and launching a satellite into space Russia had a sharply focused goal
and an immediate means of determining success); see also STINE, supra note 54, at 8. (arguing that
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where the necessary “leaps” to achieve a technological solution are at
least conceivable.56 There have long been scholars who have cautioned
against using the success of mission-oriented policies, in fields like
defense, as a model for tackling the multidimensional or “wicked”
problems of today.57 Doubts about the translatability of a
mission-oriented approach to tackling problems like climate change or
AMR have also underpinned the muted reaction that Mazzucato’s more
recent work has received in some quarters.58
The authors are by no means advocates of the view that the best
thing government can do for innovation is to stay out of the way.
Nevertheless, caution needs to be exercised before assuming that the
success of mission-oriented approaches in dealing with acute
emergencies can be readily translated to chronic emergencies, like
climate change. Acute emergencies are accompanied by broader societal
changes that produce shifts in culture and mindset.59 Taking the
current pandemic as an example, scientists responsible for developing
new vaccines have received standing ovations at sporting events.60
Indeed, they have even had dolls made in their image.61 Authorities on
“[t]he Manhattan project had a clear and singular goal—the creation of a nuclear bomb. For the
Apollo program, the goal was also clear and singular—land American astronauts on the moon and
return them safely to Earth.”).
56.
For example, vaccines which could be modified to target the Covid “spike” protein
existed prior to the current pandemic and, thus, the potential for a Covid vaccine was an
achievable technological goal. See Lauran Neergaard, Years of Research Laid Groundwork for
Speedy COVID-19 Vaccines, PBS NEWS HOUR (Dec. 7, 2020, 6:44 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/health/years-of-research-laid-groundwork-for-speedy-covid-19-vaccines
[https://perma.cc/7P8N-UPFJ].
57.
See, e.g., David C. Mowery, Defense-Related R&D as a Model for “Grand Challenges”
Technology Policies, 41 RSCH. POL’Y 1703, 1705 (2012).
58.
John Kay, Mission Economy by Mariana Mazzucato – Could Moonshot Thinking Help
Fix the Planet?, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/86475b94-3636-49ec-9b3f7d7756350b30 [https://perma.cc/369X-GR2Y].
59.
There has long been a strand of sociology interested in the interrelated themes of
emergency, disaster and catastrophe, and the capacity of such crises to produce social change. See,
e.g., SAMUEL HENRY PRINCE, CATASTROPHE AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1920); Frederick L. Bates &
Walter G. Peacock, Disaster and Social Change, in SOCIOLOGY OF DISASTERS (Russell R. Dynes,
Bruna De Marchi & Carlo Pelanda eds., 1987).
60.
Tom Morgan, Toast of Wimbledon: Standing Ovation for the Vaccine Scientist
Who
Smashed
It,
TELEGRAPH
(June
28,
2021,
8:01
PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/06/28/toast-wimbledon-vaccine-hero-receives-standing-ovation/
[https://perma.cc/J3XS-J7BP].
61.
Nicola Slawson, Vaccinologist Barbie: Prof Sarah Gilbert Honoured with a
Doll, GUARDIAN (Aug. 4, 2021, 12:00 AM), https://amp.theguardian.com/society/2021/aug/04/vaccinologist-barbie-prof-sarah-gilbert-honoured-with-a-doll [https://perma.cc/TK6S-FE2F]. Of course,
this emergency has also seen some sectors of the community express extreme distrust of scientists
and other experts. See Robert Burrell & Catherine Kelly, The COVID-19 Pandemic and the
Challenge for Innovation Policy, 71 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 89 (2020). As we have noted previously, the

2022]

INNOVATION POLICY & CHRONIC EMERGENCIES

233

previously obscure subjects, like theoretical epidemiology and the
history of pandemics, have become regular guests on radio and
television.62 With this rehabilitation of the role of the expert in public
life, the anti-intellectualism that accompanied recent populist political
movements has begun to lose its appeal, at least among swing voters.63
Against this backdrop, political objections to throwing large sums of
public money at scientific projects with uncertain prospects of success
become much less persuasive.64
Acute crises can also motivate individuals to go to extraordinary
lengths to contribute to the commonweal.65 It is notable, for example,
that both modern and contemporary accounts of innovation during the
Second World War emphasize the importance of the pressure of the
times in motivating both individual effort and collective action.66 For
example, James Bryant Conant, chairman of the pivotal wartime US
National Defense Research Committee, wrote in 1947 that the
“emotional pressure of war” was such that “no peacetime effort could
possibly operate as effectively…simply because human beings outdo
themselves when their friends and relatives are facing the ordeal of
battle. They outdo themselves both in terms of hours of labor and in
terms of cooperation with other people.”67 The sense of common purpose
and the drive to contribute that accompany acute emergencies also

anti-vaxxer movement presents significant challenges to the successful role out of public health
responses. See id.
62.
See, e.g., Covid-19 Portfolio: In the Media, YALE UNIV.: PROGRAM IN THE HIST. OF SCI.
& MED., https://hshm.yale.edu/covid-19-portfolio/in-the-media [https://perma.cc/US7C-HGF6]
(last visited Sept. 15, 2021) (detailing the radio, television and podcast contributions of academics
in Yale University’s Program in the History of Science and Medicine).
63.
For a discussion of the relationship between anti-intellectualism, mistrust of
scientific opinion, and populism, see, e.g., Eric Merkley, Anti-Intellectualism, Populism, and
Motivated Resistance to Expert Consensus, 84 PUB. OP. Q. 24 (2020). It has been reported that an
internal report for the Trump campaign blamed poor handling of the pandemic for President
Trump’s failure to be re-elected. See Josh Dawsey, Poor Handling of Virus Cost Trump
His Reelection, Campaign Autopsy Finds, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2021, 11:26 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/poor-handling-of-virus-cost-trump-his-reelection-campaign-autopsy-finds/2021/02/01/92d60002-650b-11eb-886d-5264d4ceb46d_story.html
[https://perma.cc/MEE7-SFJC].
64.
This is a point that Margaret O’Mara has made in relation to the money that flowed
into the US electronics industry in the context of the space race and the cold war. See Jackson
Square Ventures Book Club, Margaret O’Mara discusses The Code: Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zt14lSOzLIs
[https://perma.cc/V3A3-75A2] (“[T]here was no one in Washington [asking] aren’t you spending too
much?”).
65.
See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text.
66.
Gross & Sampat, supra note 25.
67.
James B. Conant, The Mobilization of Science for the War Effort, 35 AM. SCIENTIST
194, 200 (1947).
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increase the ability of the state to recruit and retain managerial
expertise.68 James Bryant Conant was President of Harvard when he
was recruited to the war effort.69 During the present crisis, the UK
government recruited Kate Bingham, a well-known British venture
capitalist, to run the United Kingdom’s vaccination rollout program,
one of the few elements of the pandemic that the UK government has
handled well.70
A degree of caution also needs to be exercised over the
characterization of the Space Race and the success of the Apollo
missions. It is now easy to forget that at the time the American space
program was launched, Soviet dominance in the field was widely
perceived as an existential threat, and it has been said that “space
exploration is a prime example of the blurring lines between military
and civilian activities during the Cold War.”71 It is also worth
remembering that key figures in the American space program had their
identity and approach fashioned during the Second World War.72 For
example, Robert Gilruth, Director of NASA’s Manned Spacecraft Center
in the 1960s and early 1970s, had worked during the war on aircraft
design and the physical stresses on pilots caused by increased flight
speeds.73 More (in)famously, Wernher von Braun, Director of NASA’s
Marshall Space Flight Center and chief architect of the Saturn V launch
vehicle, headed the team that developed the V-2 missile for the Nazis.74
Replicating the urgency, sense of purpose, and spirit of
cooperation that accompany acute emergencies is always going to be a
challenge when dealing with chronic emergencies and other scenarios.
This should make us cautious about the likely efficacy of
mission-oriented initiatives. Consider, for example, the lists of strategic
research priorities that have become de rigueur for public research
funding agencies.75 This approach exemplifies the sort of
68.
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text; infra notes 69–70 and accompanying
text.
69.
James B. Conant, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/James-B-Conant [https://perma.cc/HPE3-CSGH] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
70.
Mark Landler & Benjamin Mueller, Vaccine Rollout Gives U.K. a Rare Win in the
Pandemic, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/29/world/europe/covid-vaccine-uk.html
[https://perma.cc/X9SA-KZSL] (Mar. 1, 2021).
71.
Werth, supra note 34, at 586.
72.
See infra notes 73–74.
73.
See Andrew Chaikin, Bob Gilruth, the Quiet Force Behind Apollo, SMITHSONIAN MAG.:
AIR & SPACE MAG. (Feb. 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/quiet-forcebehind-apollo-180957788/ [https://perma.cc/U6XZ-L37P].
74.
MICHAEL NEUFELD, VON BRAUN: DREAMER OF SPACE, ENGINEER OF WAR 69 (2008).
75.
See Strategic Priorities Fund, U.K. RSCH. & INNOVATION, https://www.ukri.org/ourwork/our-main-funds/strategic-priorities-fund/ [https://perma.cc/T6NM-CSNB] (last visited
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mission-oriented intervention that some scholars would like to see more
of and, at least in form, is largely indistinguishable from the strategic
expedition of research related to the current pandemic. However, if the
impetus provided by an acute emergency is absent, scientists and
researchers will be less likely to bend their agendas to meet priorities
set by others.76 Consequently, there is a danger that in ordinary times,
such strategic research priorities may be less effective and encourage
some applicants to engage in the window dressing of projects that are
only tangentially related to a strategic goal.77
To reiterate, none of this is a call for inaction, but rather a call
for caution. There is now a body of scholarship that takes the limits and
possibilities of mission-oriented approaches seriously.78 This literature
is too rich to summarize fairly here, but one consistent theme is that
mission-oriented approaches do much better when there is
decentralization, preservation of space for scientific and technical
creativity, and the opportunity to work on different potential solutions
in parallel.79 As British economist John Kay has put it, in typically
acerbic style, the US government may have paved the way for Silicon
Valley, “but thank goodness the development was in the hands of Steve
Jobs, Travis Kalanick, and Elon Musk rather than a committee in the

Jan.
24,
2022);
Search
and
Research
Priorities,
AUSTL.
RSCH.
COUNCIL,
https://www.arc.gov.au/grants/grant-application/science-and-research-priorities
[https://perma.cc/68EH-D9JR] (Nov. 4, 2019).
76.
See generally Jochen Gläser & Grit Laudel, Governing Science: How Science Policy
Shapes Research Content, 57 EUR. J. SOCIO. 117 (2016) (exploring the link between states’ public
policy goals and governance initiatives and research and development).
77.
Id. at 126–27 (“Scientists responded to this new funding strategy by casting their
fields and topics as particularly promising . . . . [I]n addition to the window dressing triggered by
targeted funding, such funding also increases research on the intended topics.”); see also Norma
Morris, Science Policy in Action: Policy and the Researcher, 38 MINERVA 425 (2000) (discussing the
history and impact of incorporating “national economic benefits” and other public goals into the
allocation of research funding in the United Kingdom).
78.
See generally Richard R. Nelson, The Moon and the Ghetto Revisited, 38 SCI. & PUB.
POL’Y 681 (2011) (identifying the reasons for uneven technological progress and exploring how
progress might be increased in areas of great need). As Nelson explains, one of the key intellectual
insights to emerge from the innovation studies literature is that technological change needs to be
understood in terms of “innovation systems.” Id. at 687. He argues, “the innovation-system concept
provided an alternative to a point of view that government support of R&D should only be justified
on grounds of ‘market failure’.” Id. However, this observation by itself does not tell us when and
how government intervention can produce meaningful results. Id.
79.
See, e.g., Conant, supra note 67, at 200 (“Flexibility and decentralization were
characteristics of the organization which was built, and without these basic principles I believe
success could never have been attained . . . . Perhaps all this is mere rationalization on my part.
But at all events, my story is concerned with a highly decentralized and flexible temporary
government agency created under stress. It resembled a university with many faculties and many
almost autonomous departments, rather than an industrial corporation.”).
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department of commerce.”80 This conclusion chimes with Margaret
O’Mara’s detailed study of the early years of Northern California’s
electronics industry: “The case of the Valley chipmakers underscores
that public investment mattered greatly, but that how that money was
spent mattered even more. The decentralized, privatized, fast-moving
public contracting environment encouraged entrepreneurship.”81
In summary, acute emergencies create the conditions in which
mission-oriented policies stand the best prospects of producing
successful outcomes: funding increases; researchers are motivated by
some combination of commitment to the public good and fears for
themselves and loved ones; public attention and acclaim feeds into this
motivation and causes new actors to turn their minds to the problems
at hand. But even if these conditions apply, there are still good and bad
ways of implementing mission-oriented innovation policies, with
decentralization and preservation of scientific freedom being key. With
these issues in mind, we consider what lessons can be learned from
Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly
regarding the approach to solving chronic challenges.
III. THE REWARDS OF HISTORY
Before embarking on a discussion of historical examples of
mission-oriented solutions to technological problems, we must first ask
why looking back at Britain’s experience of the industrial revolution is
an instructive exercise for modern policy makers. Part of the answer
lies in the fact that this was a period of extraordinary technological
growth,82 but two further considerations are also worth mentioning.
80.
Kay, supra note 58.
81.
O’MARA, supra note 39, at 73.
82.
That the industrial revolution was characterized by rapid technological change is
universally accepted and understood, but the drivers of the industrial revolution remain fiercely
contested, and there are some historians who maintain that technological change was a symptom
rather than a cause of the industrial revolution. See, e.g., ERIC HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EMPIRE
(Penguin Books 1999) (1969) (arguing that it was only once the United Kingdom had
secured a vast market for its products in colonial territories by means of an aggressive military
strategy that it made sense for entrepreneurs to invest in new technologies, and concluding that
the new technologies of the period rested on the “application of simple ideas and devices, often of
ideas available for centuries”). However, in most recent accounts there seems to be a consensus
that some degree of importance has to be attached to the new ways in which technical
information came to be shared and employed over the course of the eighteenth century and the
new “improving mentality” that emerged during this period. As to this mentality, see infra notes
148–56 and accompanying text. For an excellent and accessible historiography of the industrial
revolution, see JOSEPH E. INIKORI, AFRICANS AND THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND
89–155 (2002). For an earlier, but still influential and important historiography, see R. M.
Hartwell, The Causes of the Industrial Revolution: An Essay in Methodology 18 ECON. HIST. REV.
164 (1965).
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The first is that this period already looms large in contemporary
academic and political debates about mission-oriented innovation
policy.83 In particular, it appears to have become obligatory in all
modern discussions of prizes to reference the Longitude Prize.84 The
Longitude Prize was created by the British Parliament in 1714 and
offered a cash sum to anyone who could invent a method of finding a
ship’s longitude at sea, one of the greatest scientific problems of its
time.85 In the United Kingdom, a new grand innovation challenge prize
fund has been established to tackle antibiotic resistance by
incentivizing the production of a point-of-care test kit for bacterial
infections.86 Operating as Longitude 2014, this prize was
self-consciously modeled on its eighteenth-century precursor.87
If history is to help guide our decisions—something that, for
better or worse, is already occurring—then at the very least, we need to
be careful about the lessons that history has to offer. As argued in detail
elsewhere88 and outlined below, it should be recognized that the original
Longitude Prize was not in any way typical of the levers used by the
British state to incentivize innovation during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries.
A second consideration is that during this period, significant
strides were made to tackle what might now be classified as chronic
emergencies.89 The absence of an accurate means of determining
longitude was one such problem—it had plagued navigation for
hundreds of years. European nations had intermittently sought a
technical solution for more than a century before Britain established
the Board of Longitude.90 Other chronic problems to which innovators
turned their attention included contagious diseases like smallpox,

83.
See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 43 at 72–75; THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE, surpa note 10,
at 125–26; M. Diane Burtona & Tom Nicholas, Prizes, Patents and the Search for Longitude, 64
EXPLS. ECON. HIST. 21 (2017); Jaison G. Morgan, Inducing Innovation Through Prizes, 3
INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 105 (2008).
84.
Burtona & Nicholas, supra note 83.
85.
Id.
86.
About the Prize, LONGITUDE PRIZE, https://longitudeprize.org/about-the-prize/
[https://perma.cc/WA3J-ZECR] (last visited Sept. 14, 2021) (striving to enable healthcare professionals to administer the most appropriate antibiotic and thereby slow the development of antibiotic resistance).
87.
See, e.g., David Cameron promises £1m ‘Longitude Prize’ for Big Ideas, BBC (June 14,
2013), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22892443 [https://perma.cc/2HKT-3YKL] (noting,
for example, that the Prime Minister stated “[t]he original Longitude Prize stimulated a solution
to a great technical problem of the time—and it was won by an ‘outsider’.”).
88.
See Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 873.
89.
See infra notes 90–92 and accompanying text.
90.
See KHAN, supra note 43, at 73–74.
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ophthalmia, and tuberculosis.91 This was a product of a profound shift
in the understanding of what science might achieve. Before this shift,
most people, including scientific elites, understood disease to be
inextricably intertwined with the divine, and not necessarily
susceptible to human agency.92
The foundation of our historical analysis is a dataset the authors
compiled and published in 2014 looking at prizes and rewards (broadly
interpreted) for inventors in Britain between 1732 and 1840.93 The
following summarizes the arguments and findings presented in detail
in that publication. The research revealed a complex pattern of state
intervention in science and technology in the eighteenth and nineteenth

91.
The smallpox example is straightforward. Smallpox had been a problem for centuries
and by the eighteenth century was still killing hundreds of thousands of people each year. It is
estimated, for example, that across the course of the eighteenth century, smallpox killed every
tenth child born in Sweden or France and every seventh child born in Russia. WHO, THE WORLD
HEALTH REPORT 2007: A SAFER FUTURE 5 (2007). The severity and longstanding nature of the
disease helps explain why Edward Jenner’s pioneering work in developing a successful
vaccination is still widely remembered. See infra notes 103, 163 and accompanying text. Jenner’s
work did not, however, occur in a vacuum. On the contrary, in English medical circles there was
active interest in inoculating patients against smallpox from 1718 onwards. Cary P. Gross & Kent
A. Sepkowitz, The Myth of the Medical Breakthrough: Smallpox, Vaccination, and Jenner
Reconsidered, 3 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 54, 56 (1998). Ophthalmia, in contrast, became a
significant health problem in Europe after 1798 when it was contracted by troops fighting in Egypt
during the Napoleonic wars and brought back to Europe at the conclusion of that campaign. See
Robert M. Feibel, John Vetch and the Egyptian Ophthalmia, 28 SURV. OPHTHALMOLOGY 128,
128–29 (1983). The scale and significance of the chronic health problems that were caused by what
was at the time known as “Egyptian ophthalmia” are now only remembered by medical historians,
but it has been said that after 1798, “[f]or the next forty years, the Egyptian ophthalmia was to
have a greater impact upon civilian and military affairs than any other disease since the bubonic
plague.” Id. at 128. For analysis of the efforts of medical officers stationed in Egypt to treat
Egyptian ophthalmia and other chronic diseases like the plague, see Catherine Kelly, The
Development of the Military Medical Officer During the Napoleonic Wars c. 1798–1801, 27 CAN.
BULL. MED. HIST. 321 (2016). For a detailed description of the military and government response
to the epidemic in Britain in the first decade of the nineteenth century, see CATHERINE KELLY,
WAR AND THE MILITARIZATION OF BRITISH ARMY MEDICINE, 1793–1830 (2011). Tuberculosis is a
somewhat more complicated example. At the time tuberculosis was known as consumption and,
like smallpox, had been a scourge throughout much of human history. Thomas M. Daniel, The
History of Tuberculosis, 100 RESPIRATORY MED. 1862 (2006). However, during the period with
which the authors are concerned, consumption was also aestheticized and became associated with
virtues like delicacy and sensitivity. SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 61 (1978). It has been
argued, however, that the relationship between the medical profession and this romanticized
image was complex, and physicians like Dr. Thomas Beddoes were committed to treating
consumption as a serious disease that required the development of novel treatments. Clark Lawlor
& Akihito Suzuki, The Disease of the Self: Representing Consumption, 1700–1830, 74 BULL. HIST.
MED. 458 (2000).
92.
See HANNAH NEWTON, MISERY TO MIRTH: RECOVERY FROM ILLNESS IN EARLY MODERN
ENGLAND 9–14 (2018).
93.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43.
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centuries.94 State intervention came in diverse guises and was not static
across the period.95 However, the most striking feature of state
intervention in this period, at least to modern eyes, is the central
importance of post hoc rewards for inventors.96 The authors have
argued elsewhere that, because post hoc rewards were such a
prominent part of the innovation landscape during the industrial
revolution, it is appropriate to talk about the existence of a reward
system that sat alongside the still-developing patent system and
ameliorated some of its failures.97
At the apex of this system of rewards were grants from
Parliament.98 These grants were awarded by Parliament in response to
petitions from inventors, but Parliament gave no guidance as to the
categories of endeavors that might attract its approval.99 The British
state used these rewards to endorse some of the most important
discoveries of the period.100 Sometimes this was done through
lump-sum payments.101 In total, the authors have identified thirty or so
payments made to individuals in the period 1730–1840 worth, in
aggregate, in excess of £200,000.102 The most famous example is
probably the payment of £30,000 to Edward Jenner for developing the
smallpox vaccine,103 but smaller sums were awarded for improvements

94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.; see also Robert Burrell & Catherine Kelly, Parliamentary Rewards and the
Evolution of the Patent System, 74 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 423 (2015).
98.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 886.
99.
Id. at 873–74.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. Providing the equivalent current value is complex. For example, if one takes this
sum at 1800 (as representing more or less the midpoint in the system of parliamentary
payments), the commonly accepted methods of conversion produce a range of slightly more than
£14 million to considerably in excess of £800 million. Five Ways to Compute Relative Value of
a UK Pound Amount, 1270 to Present, MEASURING WORTH, https://www.measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/ [https://perma.cc/WL3Z-G4W2] (last visited Jan. 25, 2022) (enter “1800” in
the box labelled “1270 to 1970 Initial Year”; enter 200,000 in the box labelled “Initial Amount:
pounds”; enter 2013 in the box labelled “Desired Year”; then click calculate). For current purposes,
however, the most useful comparator is that of equivalent ‘economic status,’ which in 2013 (when
we were creating our dataset) would have equated to £206.8 million. Id.
103.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 860, 863. See generally JOHN
BARON, THE LIFE OF EDWARD JENNER, M.D. 1–61 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014) (1827) (describing
Edward Jenner’s life); RICHARD B. FISHER, EDWARD JENNER 1749–1823 (1991), 99–132.
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in textile manufacture,104 dyes,105 ship repair,106 safety at sea,107
papermaking,108 fire prevention,109 and a method of distilling potable
water from seawater.110 In addition to the cases in which Parliament
rewarded inventors through lump-sum payments, there was a small
number of cases in which Parliament chose to grant inventors an
annual pension, as, for example, with the pension of £1,200 awarded to
Henry Shrapnel for his invention of “spherical case” cannon shot.111 The
third means by which Parliament intervened on behalf of inventors was
through the grant of patent extensions.112 More than a dozen inventors
were rewarded in this way, and some received very valuable monopolies
as a result, including James Watt, who ended up enjoying a monopoly
over his steam engine that lasted more than thirty years (the ordinary
term of protection at the time being fourteen years).113
Parliamentary rewards were important, but they were only part
of a broader and more complex set of arrangements.114 For long periods,
there were also publicly funded bodies specifically charged with
promoting innovation by means of financial reward.115 However, the
Board of Longitude is the only one that is still commonly remembered.
There were also bodies charged with improving agriculture, and others
with specific responsibility for Scotland.116 Moreover, government
departments would also sometimes intervene directly to promote
innovation.117 The Admiralty was particularly active in this regard, and
its intervention extended to paying money to deserving inventors.118
The authors found, for example, that the Admiralty made payments to
inventors of improved anchors and methods of raising ships on
blocks.119

104.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 886.
105.
Id. at 861–63.
106.
Id. at 864.
107.
Id. at 863.
108.
Id. at 864.
109.
Id. at 862.
110.
Id. at 882.
111.
Id. at 864.
112.
Id. at 865.
113.
Id. at 865–68. As to the ordinary term of protection, see Statute of Monopolies 1624,
21 Jac. c. 3, § 6 (Eng.).
114.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43.
115.
Id. at 868–69.
116.
Id. at 870–71.
117.
Id. at 869.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
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Furthermore, no account of the reward system would be
complete without mention of the Society for the Encouragement of Arts,
Manufactures and Commerce—later the Royal Society of Arts (the
“Society”). The Society was established in 1755 and was a private body
insofar as it was funded through subscription.120 In practice, however,
the Society was entwined in a complex network of relations with state
actors, and support from the Society was often important to the
reception of inventions by government.121 The granting of rewards
formed an important part of the Society’s activities and, by the
standards of the day, led to the disbursement of impressive sums.122 For
example, in the period 1755–1763, the Society expended £8,496 on cash
prizes and medals.123 Beyond these peak bodies, there were all sorts
of other organizations and arrangements that popped up across
the period for conferring rewards.124 For example, the short-lived
Anti-Gallican Association, founded in 1745 “to oppose the insidious arts
of the French nation” and “promote British manufactures,” awarded
a number of premiums for improvements in English lace and
needlework.125
Subsequent historical research has shown that the system of
rewards spread beyond Britain to its colonies.126 For example, Aaron
Graham has shown that rewards formed an important part of the
Jamaican legal landscape in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.127 Similarly, the authors have discovered that rewards were
given to inventors in the early Australian colonies,128 where they were

120.
See generally DEREK HUDSON & KENNETH LUCKHURST, THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF ARTS,
1754–1954, at 12 (1954) (describing the founding of the Royal Society of Arts).
121.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 870.
122.
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
123.
HUDSON & LUCKHURST, supra note 120.
124.
See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
125.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 871.
126.
See infra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
127.
Aaron Graham, Patents and Invention in Jamaica and the British Atlantic Before
1857, 73 ECON. HIST. REV. 940, 954–57 (2020).
128.
Such rewards included, inter alia, the grants given to John Macarthur in 1805 for his
work with sheep breeding and to James King in 1832 for his work using white sand to make glass.
Wool Away, John Macarthur, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Apr. 7, 1934, at 11; David S. Macmillan,
King, James (1800–1857), AUSTL. DICTIONARY OF BIOGRAPHY (2006), https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/king-james-2307 [https://perma.cc/HZY9-A7RV]. The grant of land to Macarthur is noted,
for example, in the obituary that was published to mark the centenary of his death and is recorded
in his entry in the Australian Dictionary of Biography. Wool Away, supra; Margaret
Steven, Macarthur, John (1767–1834), AUSTL. DICTIONARY OF BIOGRAPHY (2006),
https://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/macarthur-john-2390 [https://perma.cc/RHM8-4WJB]. The right
of King to acquire crown land at a reduced price is similarly recorded in the Australian Dictionary
of Biography. Macmillan, supra.
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understood to have a role in establishing new industries in the harsh
conditions of Australia’s founding.129 Moreover, as in Britain, this
system of rewards overlapped and intersected with rewards granted by
other bodies, with the Society doing so through its Committee of
Colonies and Trade.130 The Society was particularly active in New South
Wales, awarding medals to a number of local innovators, including
those petitioning the government for rewards.131 The spread of the
reward system to the colonies helps demonstrate that it was an
accepted and important legal technology that had its place alongside
the patent system.
A system of rewards largely under state control created an
innovation ecosystem far removed from the paradigm of neoliberal
imagination. Equally, however, the reward system cannot comfortably
be characterized as mission-oriented. Above all, a generalized system of
rewards does not provide a proactive steer as to the types of innovation
that society is seeking to incentivize any more than the patent system
does. This is not to say that no efforts were made to steer the direction
of inventive effort.132 On the contrary, there were times when both the
Society and state bodies, including Parliament, would signal
priorities.133 When, for instance, Parliament granted the Board of
Agriculture an additional £800 over and above its usual operating
budget in 1801, this was on the basis the money would be distributed
in “premiums for essays on breaking up grasslands.”134 Even when
granting rewards directly, Parliament would sometimes express the
expectation that part of the sum granted would be plowed back into
research to help perfect the invention.135 Importantly, however, even in

129.
See, e.g., ROBERT HUGHES, THE FATAL SHORE: THE EPIC OF AUSTRALIA’S FOUNDING
282–322 (1986).
130.
See Henry Trueman Wood, The Royal Society of Arts IV—The Society and the
Colonies (1754–1847), 59 J. ROYAL SOC’Y ARTS 1030 (1911); see also D. G. C. Allan, “Dear and
Serviceable to Each Other”: Benjamin Franklin and the Royal Society of Art, 144 PROCS. AM. PHIL.
SOC’Y 245 (2000) (discussing Benjamin Franklin’s work as chairman of this committee
during the early 1760s at a time when Franklin was living in London).
131.
For example, the Society granted medals to both Macarthur and King. See T. Nowlan,
Marsh & Ebsworth, Colonies and Trade, 40 TRANSACTIONS SOC’Y, INSTITUTED LONDON, FOR
ENCOURAGEMENT ARTS, MFRS., & COM. 230, (1822); James King & Apsley Pellat, No. III. Sand for
Glass, from New South Wales,
51 TRANSACTIONS SOC’Y, INSTITUTED LONDON, FOR
ENCOURAGEMENT ARTS, MFRS., & COM. 90, 90 (1836).
132.
See, e.g., infra note 134 and accompanying text.
133.
See, e.g., infra note 134 and accompanying text.
134.
Accounts, Presented to the House of Commons, Respecting the Public Income of Great
Britain, for the year ending fifth of January 1802 (May 31 & June 11, 1802).
135.
Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 864 (discussing, for
example, the payments to Sir William Congreve to enable him to continue his experiments with
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these instances, the system remained entirely decentralized, leaving
the maximum possible latitude for scientific creativity.
Against this background, it is ironic that the Longitude Prize
attracts so much attention in modern scholarship.136 The Longitude
Prize was not regarded as a success by contemporaries and, notably,137
was not a model that was rolled out to tackle other problems of the time.
The Board of Longitude suffered from a range of problems, but a key
consideration that is now sometimes lost is that the original Longitude
Prize was governed by a strict set of clearly articulated criteria.138 The
struggles of John Harrison to claim the reward have been extensively
documented by historians of the period.139 There may be truth in the
argument that Harrison was unfairly treated by the scientific
establishment of the day because of his background,140 but there also
may be truth in the view that Harrison was an awkward character who
did little to help himself.141 But a further consideration, as Jonathan
Siegel has carefully documented, is that the criteria governing the prize
were such that it was difficult for the Board to determine what a “win”
looked like.142 Yet even the original Longitude Prize, as modern
defenders are quick to point out, was careful not to prescribe the means
by which a solution might be found:
The Longitude Act set forth a simply stated goal with no mention of any specific
method or solution that might lead to success—or any discussion of solutions that
should be avoided . . . the Act left the field of possible solutions entirely open, and
potential contributors free to pursue their own divergent ideas.143

It is now more or less impossible to imagine the re-creation of a
comprehensive system of post hoc financial rewards given modern

methods of impeding the forgery of bank notes and to Charles Babbage to allow him to continue
working on the production of his “difference engine”).
136.
See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 43, at 72–75; MISSION ECONOMY, supra note 27, at
125–26.
137.
Katy Barrett, “Explaining” Themselves: The Barrington Papers, the Board of
Longitude, and the Fate of John Harrison, 65 NOTES & RECS. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 145 (2011)
(examining the efforts of the Commissioners of the Board of Longitude to defend their actions to
an increasingly skeptical Parliament).
138.
See Jonathan R. Siegel, Law and Longitude, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1 (2009).
139.
The most famous analysis is DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE
GENIUS WHO SOLVED THE GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995).
140.
Id.
141.
Jim Bennett, The Travels and Trials of Mr Harrison’s Timekeeper, in INSTRUMENTS,
TRAVEL AND SCIENCE: ITINERARIES OF PRECISION FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 75, 81–84 (Marie N. Bourguet, Christian Licoppe & H. Otto Sibum eds., 2002).
142.
See Siegel, supra note 138, at 38–39.
143.
Robin W. Spencer, Open Innovation in the Eighteenth Century: The Longitude
Problem, 55 RSCH. TECH. MGMT. 39, 41 (2012).
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controls on the dispersal of public funds.144 Moreover, given the
problems of political patronage that dogged the operation of the reward
system,145 it is far from clear that re-creation of such a system would be
desirable. And yet, it is difficult not to be struck by the extraordinary
creativity and ingenuity of British society during this period.146 A
variety of explanations have been offered for this phenomenon, but one
thing that has often struck those immersed in the period is that there
was a culture of innovation and improvement that infused society.147 As
Alfred North Whitehead writing in the 1920s put it, the early half of
the nineteenth century was a period “in which a new attitude to change
was first established and enjoyed.”148 More recently, Anton Howes has
stressed the importance of the “improving mentality” that emerged
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.149 This
“mentality was not an abstract ideal, nor was it a skill: it was a lens
through which to see the world. It was a frame of mind through which
processes and products appeared imperfect and in need of bettering.”150
Moreover, this improving mentality was consciously and actively
evangelized.151 This was the period in which the cult of the heroic
inventor began to emerge.152 Even if, as Christine Macleod has argued,
the transformation of inventors into national heroes was more about
domestic politics than the desire to promote science or technology per
144.
See MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY 43 (1997) (noting that since the 1980s “there
have been profound changes in the nature of public administration” that have
“emphasize[d] cost control, financial transparency, the autonomization of organizational
sub-units, the decentralization of management authority, the creation of market and
quasi-market mechanisms separating purchasing and providing functions and their linkage via
contract”). A general system of unplanned, post hoc payments for inventors on the basis of their
commitment to the collective good would be almost impossible to square with the mentality of
audit that has brought with it different understandings of trust and risk. Indeed, we acknowledge
that even our preferred model of open-ended and flexible prize competitions would strain the
boundaries of what is now thought to be acceptable.
145.
See Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 875–76.
146.
See, e.g., Ralf Meisenzahl & Joel Mokyr, The Rate and Direction of Invention in the
British Industrial Revolution: Incentives and Institutions, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF
INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 443, 446–49 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stern, eds., 2012).
147.
JOEL MOKYR, A CULTURE OF GROWTH: THE ORIGINS OF THE MODERN ECONOMY 4–6
(2017).
148.
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN WORLD 96 (Simon &
Schuster 1967) (1925).
149.
Anton Howes, The Spread of Improvement: Why Innovation Accelerated in Britain
1547–1851, at 7 (Apr. 2017) (unpublished working paper) (cited with the author’s permission),
https://www.antonhowes.com/uploads/2/1/0/8/21082490/spread_of_improvement_working_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY2J-LKJB].
150.
Id.
151.
Id. at 12, 17–18.
152.
Christine MacLeod, The Invention of Heroes, 460 NATURE 572 (2009).
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se, the effect was still to place scientists and engineers at the center of
public imagination. The “elevation of inventors to fame” was one of the
factors that pushed the emergent middle classes “to begin innovating
on an immense scale.”153 Consequently, the landscape for innovation
was characterized not just by a handful of inventors of revolutionary
breakthroughs but also by an army of “tweakers” who “improved and
debugged existing inventions, adapted them to new uses, and combined
them in new applications.”154
In a society with a culture of inventorship and improvement,
there is reason to believe that a good deal of innovation was happening
without regard to patents, rewards, or other financial inducements,
with the promise of recognition and the sheer joy of creative endeavor
being sufficient motivation.155 It was an environment in which the
“instinct of contrivance” was fostered and given free rein.156 This is not
to suggest that the institutional environment was unimportant. There
is a good case to be made that the patent system was at least somewhat
effective in providing returns to inventors from the middle of the
eighteenth century.157 There is also every reason to believe that some
inventors would have hoped for recognition through the reward
system.158 The publicity that attached to the grant of rewards during
this period was such that some inventors must have internalized this
possibility.159 That some such inventors may have been guilty of
irrational exuberance in harboring hopes of a reward does not mean
that the reward system was ineffective in spurring their efforts.160

153.
DEIRDRE N. MCCLOSKEY, BOURGEOIS DIGNITY: WHY ECONOMICS CAN’T EXPLAIN THE
MODERN WORLD 17 (2010).
154.
Meisenzahl & Mokyr, supra note 146, at 446.
155.
This is a point that is now most often made in the relation to the production of works
of fanfiction and the like, but it is a point that can equally be applied to other forms of creative
endeavor, particularly in an environment where such endeavors are lauded. For a sophisticated
analysis of these themes in the copyright context, see Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair
Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513 (2009).
156.
Cf. FRANK W. TAUSSIG, INVENTORS AND MONEY-MAKERS 12–19 (1915) (describing
inventors’ inclination to invent as influenced by both instincts and environmental influences).
157.
See SEAN BOTTOMLEY, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM DURING THE INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION, 1700–1852: FROM PRIVILEGE TO PROPERTY (2014).
158.
Robert Burrell & Catherine Kelly, Myths of the Medical Methods Exclusion: Medicine
and Patents in Nineteenth Century Britain, 38 LEGAL STUD. 607, 620–22 (2018).
159.
Id.
160.
In a similar vein, see JOEL MOKYR, THE LEVER OF RICHES 252 (1990) [hereinafter
LEVER OF RICHES] (discussing the impact of Britain’s admittedly flawed patent system during this
period, and arguing “[i]t could thus well be that the patent system fooled would-be inventors into
exerting more effort than they would have had they known how stacked the deck was against
them”).
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There is, however, another important feature of the institutional
environment that has received less attention than it deserves; namely,
that it was also a period marked by regulatory innovation. The original
Longitude Act may have been a failure, but on another view, it was
itself an “important invention: the well-defined, goal-oriented, open
innovation challenge . . . the Longitude Act remains highly relevant as
the invention of a process.”161 There was an unshakable commitment to
getting what society would now think of as innovation policy right, and
this commitment was itself accompanied by a spirit of experimentation.
This is why the period is characterized by overlapping systems of
sometimes short-lived arrangements: the grant of patent extensions,
pensions, prizes, and rewards were all part of a commitment to finding
the best means of ensuring that existing inventors were fairly
remunerated and future inventors were adequately incentivized.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that in this period, there was at least one
attempt to incentivize innovation through what would now be
understood as a tax expenditure regime: as part of Parliament’s
attempt to encourage the development of new ways of transporting fish
to London, legislation was passed to reduce the tolls for fish carriages.162
Some of these regulatory innovations, including the original Longitude
Act, were unquestionably ill-conceived, but they also served as markers
of what society thought was important. They fed into (as well as fed off)
the improving mentality that defined the era. Rewards, in particular,
were used to send a signal that society valued scientific and technical
endeavors; that accumulation of wealth was not the only criterion by
which to judge an individual’s contribution to society; that there was
something noble about “giving an invention to the world with
liberality.”163
The industrial revolution remains a key reference point for
scholars interested in the conditions that produce rapid technological
change.164 Therefore, it is unsurprising that debates about the merits of
mission-oriented innovation policy have come to encompass Britain’s
use of a prize competition to stimulate innovation in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries.165 However, the attention that has been
161.
Spencer, supra note 143, at 40.
162.
Fish Carriage Act 1762, 2 Geo. 3, c. 15.
163.
This was the language used in Parliament to describe Jenner’s decision to make his
method of vaccinating against smallpox available to the public, rather than attempting to profit
from secrecy. HC Deb (Mar. 15, 1802) (17) col. 203 (UK).
164.
See, e.g., KEALEY, supra note 42; Meisenzahl & Mokyr, supra note 146; LEVER OF
RICHES, supra note 160, 81–112.
165.
See, e.g., KHAN, supra note 43 at 72–75; THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE, supra note 10,
at 125–26; Burtona & Nicholas, supra note 83; Morgan, supra note 83.
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lavished on the Longitude Prize has proven to be something of a
distraction. It has caused scholars to fail to notice that it was post hoc
rewards, rather than prizes, that were a central feature of Britain’s
innovation landscape during the period. The system of rewards both
emerged from and helped strengthen a culture of innovation and
improvement that has long stood out to historians as one of the central
drivers of the industrial revolution.166 Importantly, moreover, the spirit
of improvement and experimentation that characterized the period also
extended to the regulatory sphere, this being an additional feature of
the innovation landscape that has received less attention than it
deserves. The final part of the Article builds on this historical analysis
and considers what lessons this analysis might have for contemporary
mission-oriented policy interventions.
IV. A SUGGESTION FOR REFORM
If there are lessons to be drawn from Britain’s experience during
the industrial revolution, they can only be at a relatively high level of
abstraction. Public life was markedly different in the eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries. There was an acceptance of the role of
political patronage that would now be unthinkable,167 and controls over
the use of public funds were not the same. It must also be remembered
that Britain was at war with France for a significant part of the period
with which this Article is concerned,168 and as was noted in Part II of
this Article, care must always be taken in extrapolating from wartime
conditions. The nature of invention may also have changed in the
interim. The myth of the heroic inventor working in isolation was only

166.
See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text.
167.
The role of patronage during the period has been widely discussed, but for present
purposes the most salient analyses are those that look at the role of patronage as a way of
organizing and promoting science during the period. See, e.g., Tim Fulford, The Role of Patronage
in Early Nineteenth-Century Science, As Evidenced in Letters from Humphry Davy to Joseph
Banks, 73 NOTES & RECS. 457 (2019).
168.
See, e.g., H. M. Scott, The Second ‘Hundred Years War’, 1689–1815, 35 HIST. J. 443,
444 (1992) (“Britain’s principal adversary throughout this period was France. This has led
historians to describe the decades from 1688 to 1815 as the Second ‘Hundred Years War’,
recalling the long period of conflict between the two states during the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries. The precise applicability of this label to the eighteenth century can be contested.
The generation after the Peace of Utrecht (1713) saw good relations and perhaps
even a suspension of hostility: ‘Seventy Years War’, to denote the almost
continual fighting from the 1740s to 1815, or even ‘Eighty Years War’, to describe the period of
unbroken rivalry from the breakdown of the Anglo-French entente in 1730-1,
might be more accurate. Nevertheless, the sheer continuity and intensity of
Anglo-French rivalry, from 1688 to 1815 and even beyond, are striking.”).
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ever that, but any new initiative must be mapped onto the world of the
modern university, today’s technology start-ups, and so on.
Nevertheless, the British experience should perhaps tell us that
there is something valuable in the public signaling of the importance of
innovation and scientific endeavor. Modern societies are not, of course,
entirely bereft of such signals: there are Nobel prizes, scientists and
innovators are still frequently rewarded through national honors
systems, and there is no shortage of press coverage of Silicon Valley’s
leading figures.169 Viewed through a historical lens, however, the public
attention and accolade afforded to modern-day innovators are
lamentable relative to their contribution to society. One does not have
to subscribe to the figure of the heroic inventor to think that society
would do well to capture something of the additional attention given to
scientists and scientific expertise during the pandemic.
The challenge posed by the wicked problems of our time, the
increasing evidence that serious problems dog the patent system, and
the potential to create stronger signaling effects all point to the
importance of finding alternative ways to incentivize innovation.170 One
area in which we might productively emulate Georgian Britain is in a
willingness to be adventurous when implementing such alternatives.
Policy makers need to be open to experimenting with different ways of
incentivizing innovation, including through the tax system, public
procurement programs, intellectual property reform, and prizes. It
needs to be accepted that some initiatives will fail, and even if an
intervention is shown to work in one field, it may not be applicable in
169.
See, e.g., Tom Hannen, Ryan Croke & Dan Dominy, This Tesla Co-founder
Has a Plan to Recycle Your EV Batteries, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/video/d59734d9-5745-46d1-afbe-622c200b3783
[https://perma.cc/N9AWJSYT]; Fani Papageorgiou, Peter Thiel, Jeff Bezos and the Quest for Immortality, FIN. TIMES
(September
13,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/681fa287-f9ff-47f3-9f44-c0736ee0ab53
[https://perma.cc/YA96-9CVQ]; Andrew Hill, ‘CEO Speak’ on Show in the Billionaire Space Race’,
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/3c4023ac-19ee-4e0f-a76f-5df118e82b41
[https://perma.cc/C24H-M9DS]; James Fontanella-Khan, Mark Vandevelde & Simeon Kerr, Bill
Gates Vehicle Buys $2.2bn Stake in Four Seasons from Saudi Royal in Dubai, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 8, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/3889fdcd-b151-4540-ae29-3a0f54216c1c
[https://perma.cc/YB9D-2NLK]; Anjana Ahuja, Silicon Valley’s Billionaires Want to Hack the Ageing Process, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/24849908-ac4a-4a7d-b53c847963ac1228 [https://perma.cc/6GAQ-L9XB].
170.
Consider, for example, empirical work that demonstrates that “patent assertion
entities” do indeed generally act as patent trolls, extracting rents from potential defendants,
rather than acting as more benign innovation intermediaries as some scholars had claimed.
Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Empirical Evidence on the Behavior and
Impact of Patent Trolls: A Survey, in PATENT ASSERTION ENTITIES AND COMPETITION POLICY (D.
Daniel Sokol ed., 2017); see also Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for
the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 (2013) (arguing that patent trolls are merely symptomatic of
larger failings of the patent system).
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another. Concomitantly, policy makers need to be willing to abandon
policy instruments and programs when the evidence shows that they
are not producing the intended results. At present, this is not occurring.
For example, consider the introduction of “patent box” regimes, that is,
a lower corporate tax rate for income derived from patent royalties.171
These began life as a good faith attempt by policy makers to incentivize
research and development, but they continue to proliferate despite
increasing evidence that they do little to promote innovation.172
A call for experimentation and acceptance of risk does not,
however, mean that we start with a blank sheet of paper. As discussed
in the first part of this Article, there is already a good deal of evidence
about interventions that are most likely to be successful—namely, those
that preserve space for scientific and technical freedom, and avoid
centralization. This needs to be kept in mind if there is a move towards
greater use of public procurement as an innovation policy lever. It is
also, however, something that needs to be borne in mind when
designing prize competitions. As has already been intimated, there has
been a resurgence of interest in prizes over recent years. In the United
Kingdom, in addition to Longitude 2014 discussed above, the National
Health Service has experimented with Innovation Challenge Prizes to
improve outcomes for patients suffering from dementia and other
serious diseases.173 In the United States, there has been a significant
increase in the use of prize competitions since the passage of the
America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010,174 which enables
federal agencies to run prize competitions related to the agency’s
mission.175 It has been reported that in the first ten years or so following
171.
GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44829, PATENT BOXES: A PRIMER 2 (2017)
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44829.pdf [https://perma.cc/TV2Z-ZPB7] (“In general, a patent
box is a tax break for business income arising from the commercial exploitation of
qualified IP. The break consists of taxing a company’s qualified IP at a
relatively low rate. This reduction in taxation can be achieved directly by
imposing a low tax rate on a company’s income from royalties or licensing fees related to eligible
IP or from the sale of such property, and indirectly by imposing the same low rate on the income
a company receives from the sale of goods and services with embedded IP owned by the company.”).
172.
See, e.g., Fabian Gaessler, Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Should There Be
Lower Taxes on Patent Income?, RSCH. POL’Y, Jan. 2021, at 1, 1 (arguing that their “results call
into question whether the patent box is an effective instrument for encouraging innovation in a
country, rather than simply preventing or facilitating the shifting of corporate in-come to low tax
jurisdictions”).
173.
See, e.g., DEP’T OF HEALTH & SOC. CARE, NHS Innovation Challenge Prize for Dementia: Winners Announced, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/nhs-innovation-challenge-prize-for-dementia-winners-announced [https://perma.cc/2S85-VDEL] (Sept. 10, 2014).
174.
America Competes Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-358, 124 Stat. 3983
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 15, 20, 33, 42, 51 U.S.C.).
175.
Id.
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the passage of this legislation, federal agencies conducted nearly one
thousand prize competitions, and by 2018, the total amount of prize
money offered exceeded $37 million.176 Alongside these public
initiatives, a number of private innovation prizes have been established
over recent years, including the XPrize for carbon removal and
sequestration backed by a $100 million donation from Elon Musk and
the Musk Foundation.177 Experimentation with prizes is to be
welcomed. Moreover, to be meaningful, any evaluation of the impact of
prizes ought to seek to quantify their role in publicizing innovation
challenges and channeling attention and expertise towards a problem.
Nevertheless, it is notable that recent prizes have tended to be
defined by relatively rigid victory criteria.178 This is an approach that
finds favor in much of the literature on prize design.179 For example, in
one influential paper, Thomas Kalil emphasizes the importance of
establishing “a specific objective and a clear definition of the victory
conditions.”180 Yet Kalil also notes that “enunciating the most
productive set of conditions is an art, not a science, and prize sponsors
have sometimes had problems articulating the criteria.”181 In a similar
vein, other respected scholars in the field are generally supportive of
using specific victory criteria, despite noting that a factor likely to
increase governance and management costs is “the difficulties in
specifying ex ante all that can happen,” such that “rule modifications
and adaptations along the way are to be expected.”182
In contrast, the authors are wary of prize competitions built
around rigidly defined criteria. By defining very specific goals, prize
competitions of this type may restrict the natural creativity of scientists
and discourage exploration of tangential ways of tackling the
underlying problem. Moreover, rigidly defined prize competitions may
be particularly unhelpful when we are looking to tackle a complex,

176.
MARCY E. GALLO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45271, FEDERAL PRIZE COMPETITIONS 7 (2020),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R45271.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5Z7-39DZ].
177.
$100m Prize for Carbon Removal, XPRIZE, https://www.xprize.org/prizes/elonmusk
[https://perma.cc/N7QN-UQAJ] (last visited Sept. 15, 2021).
178.
See, e.g., Prize Rules, LONGITUDE PRIZE, https://longitudeprize.org/prize-rules/
[https://perma.cc/3YTG-E64Q] (last visited Jan. 27, 2022) (requiring that tests must be able to give
a result to the user in “less than 30 minutes”).
179.
See infra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
180.
Thomas Kalil, Prizes for Technological Innovation 20 (The Brookings
Inst.,
Discussion
Paper
2006–08,
2006),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/200612kalil.pdf [https://perma.cc/SLF3-MSJM].
181.
Id.
182.
Fiona Murray, Scott Stern, Georgina Campbell & Alan MacCormack, Grand
Innovation Prizes: A Theoretical, Normative, and Empirical Evaluation, 41 RSCH. POL’Y 1779, 1791
(2012).
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multifaceted, or “wicked” problem since they may lead to undue
attention being given to some facets of the problem or cause us to look
in entirely the wrong direction for the best solution.
A model worthy of further study is one that seeks to combine the
mission-focused steer of prizes with the expansive culture of a rewards
system. As a preliminary point, it is important to note that the
distinction between prizes and rewards is one that needs to be handled
with care. The more the subject of “a prize” is described in broad terms,
and the more there is discretion to adjust the size of the prize after the
revelation of the nature of the invention, the closer a prize is to a
reward.183 Consideration ought to be given to establishing a small
number of prize funds targeted at broad areas of public concern, with
prizes to be awarded by a panel of experts based entirely on an ex post
assessment of the contribution made by the claimant’s breakthrough,
including the scalability of any new technology. A prize fund modeled
on these lines could be empowered to make interim payments to help
enable and encourage further development of promising ideas whilst
eschewing the award of formal milestone prizes that have found favor
in some recent prize competitions.184
There is, moreover, a historical analog for this sort of system.185
It lies in the Board of Longitude, but it does so in the period after the
resolution of Harrison’s timepiece controversy.186 Over time the Board’s
mandate was expanded to allow it to make payments in relation to a
broad range of nautical inventions.187 The Board’s very existence sent a
signal as to the types of inventions that were important, and the Board
could give further guidance as to research priorities, but the attempt to
prescribe narrow criteria for the award of a prize was largely
abandoned.188 A modern version of this system might see the
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Public Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 874.
See, e.g., $100m Prize for Carbon Removal, supra note 177.
See infra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
That is, after 1773. See Peter Johnson, The Board of Longitude 1714-1828, 99 J.
BRITISH ASTRONOMICAL ASS’N 63, 68 (1989) (“With the award of the main prize to Harrison . . . the
Board had fulfilled its role under the 1714 Act. However, it was kept in being under a new Act of
1774 which moved the emphasis away from longitude to navigation in general. The scope of the
Board became much wider.”).
187.
Id.
188.
This is an oversimplification of a complex topic, but the gradual expansion of the
Board’s remit is clear. See id.; see also Sophie Waring, The Board of Longitude and the Funding of
Scientific Work: Negotiating Authority and Expertise in the Early Nineteenth Century, 16 J. MAR.
RSCH. 55 (2014) (exploring how the Board of Longitude negotiated researchers’ needs and wants
while leveraging its authority to judge scientific expertise). The flexible role of the Board in
granting monetary awards meant that after 1800, the Board and Parliament presented alternative
avenues by which inventors might seek recompense and recognition for their efforts. See Public
Rewards and Innovation Policy, supra note 43, at 868. The Board had a number of ways of
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establishment of flexible and open-ended prize funds in the areas of
AMR and climate change. This would provide an opportunity to assess
the performance of flexible-prize funds against those of the more
targeted Longitude 2014 and X prize for carbon removal (albeit at the
cost of creating some overlap and duplication of effort).189 The creation
of prize funds modeled along these lines would mark a willingness to
experiment with the widest possible range of methods of incentivizing
innovation.
V. CONCLUSION
Serious challenges beset the world. The United Nation’s
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report published
in August 2021 has warned that it is already too late to avoid serious
impacts from climate change;190 the current pandemic is far from over
in most of the world;191 and AMR is already killing hundreds of
thousands of people each year.192 In the face of these challenges, it takes
an almost religious commitment to the idea of a small state to rule out
a greater role for a mission-oriented approach to innovation policy. But
getting a mission-oriented approach right is no simple task, particularly
outside the context of an acute emergency. It is also important to avoid
the complacent assumption that once a chronic emergency becomes
sufficiently serious, it will be reclassified in popular and political
imagination as an acute emergency and thereby become capable of
galvanizing the type of commitment to collective action seen during
wartime or a pandemic. The relationship between innovation and
adversity is complex.193 Innovation ecosystems are multifaceted and
vary significantly between technology sectors. Innovation policy
pluralism and a willingness to experiment with new and rediscovered
signaling its priorities, including by establishing sub-committees (although the history of these
sub-committees is itself complex). See Johnson, supra note 186, at 63–65. We also acknowledge
that the 1819 prize for discovering the north-west passage was run on the basis of precise
navigational criteria, but this does not detract from the general thrust of the point being made
here. Id. at 66.
189.
See supra notes 86–87, 177 and accompanying text.
190.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 47.
191.
At the time of preparing the final revisions to this paper, the United Kingdom has hit
its highest ever number of daily cases thanks to the Omicron variant that is
sweeping the country. Philip Georgiadis, Jasmine Cameron-Chileshe & Laura Hughes,
UK Hits Record Number of Daily Coronavirus Cases, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/21f34dca-362d-499f-afbd-a608ef44d211
[https://perma.cc/NB6YZS4Q].
192.
Supra notes 2, 5–6 and accompanying text.
193.
For an important recent article developing this theme, see Clark D. Asay & Stephanie
Plamondon Bair, Innovation in Adversity, 49 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. (forthcoming).
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policy levers are therefore essential.194 History can offer some useful
insights but not easy answers.

194.
The language of “innovation policy pluralism” is taken from Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa
Larrimore Ouellette, ‘Beyond the Patents-Prizes Debate’, 92 TEX. L. REV. 303 (2013) (arguing for
“innovation policy pluralism”).

